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I. INTRODUCTION

The employment relationship has gone through dramatic
changes in the last fifty years, and, with few exceptions, the notion
of company loyalty and life long employment is a thing of the
past.' As a consequence, many employers have adopted the use of
covenants not to compete in employment contracts as a mechanism
The author maintains a private practice in Knoxville, Tennessee,
where he also serves as an adjunct professor at the University of Tennessee College of Law. He received his B.A., 1977, from the State University of New
York at Oswego; M.P.A., 1979, from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and
Public Affairs at Syracuse University; and J.D., 1992, from the University of
Tennessee College of Law. The author is also a former Assistant Commissioner
of the Tennessee Department of Employment Security, former Deputy Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor, and a former Policy Advisor to
Governor Sundquist.
1. Ken Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and the "UnAmerican" Labor Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1705, 1736-37 (2004).
*
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to ensure protection of trade secrets, other confidential information, and investment in employee training.2 Traditionally a contractual tool used only with highly paid, upper-level employees,
the use of covenants not to compete has become common place
even with rank and file employees. 3 While employers view the
use of covenants not to compete as a method to protect legitimate
business interests, 4 employees typically dislike them for the corresponding reasons.
Covenants not to compete curtail legitimate career expectations, as well as limit the returns on an employee's educational
investments. 5 It is not surprising, therefore, that courts have been
Id. at 1742. Covenants not to compete are most commonly included
2.
in the following types of agreements: as part of an employment contract in
which an employee agrees not to compete with the employer after employment
termination; in the sale of a business where the seller agrees not to compete with
the buyer; and in situations where a departing partner agrees not to compete with
the partnership after dissolution. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
188 (2) (1981). This article focuses on the first type of agreement, primarily
because in the latter two situations, the parties are more likely to employ legal
counsel and have equal bargaining power in the negotiation process.
Matheny & Crain, supra note 1, at 1744. The following cases illus3.
trate the breadth of use of covenants not to compete: Borg-Warner Protective
Servs. Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 495, 502 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (security guard); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Etheridge, 582 So. 2d 1102, 1104 (Ala.
1991) (pest exterminator); Royal Servs., Inc. v. Williams, 334 So. 2d 154, 156
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (janitor); Stein Steel & Supply Co. v. Tucker, 136
S.E.2d 355, 356 (Ga. 1964) (plumbing supplier); Reardigan v. Shaw Indus., Inc.,
518 S.E.2d 144, 148 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (carpet salesman); E. Distrib. Co. v.
Flynn, 567 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Kan. 1977) (liquor deliveryman); Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram Assoc., Inc., 622 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Ky. Ct. App.
1981) (collection agency employee); Hammons v. Big Sandy Claims Serv., Inc.,
567 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (claims adjuster); Daiquiri's III on
Bourbon, Ltd. v. Wandfluh, 608 So. 2d 222, 224 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (bartender); Folsom Funeral Serv., Inc. v. Rodgers, 372 N.E.2d 532, 533 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1978) (undertaker); Nail Boutique, Inc. v. Church, 758 S.W.2d 206,
210-11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (manicurist); Brewer v. Tracy, 253 N.W.2d 319,
321-22 (Neb. 1977) (garbage collector); Carl Coiffure, Inc. v. Mourlot, 410
S.W.2d 209, 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (cosmetician).
4. Some companies, for example, use confidentiality agreements to
protect trade secrets and nonsoliciataion agreements to protect their customer
base.
Mark A. Glick et al., The Law and Economics of Post-Employment
5.
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called upon to enforce, reform, or void such agreements, particularly when employees subject to such restrictive covenants leave
their employment for better opportunities in the same or similar
6
industry or field. Despite common misperceptions, courts generally uphold covenants not to compete-if the covenants comply
with reasonable standards.
Although negotiation is expected in employment contracts for
some executive employees, those signed by most ordinary employees are form contracts drafted by the employer with little, if any,
negotiation. 7 In addition to the covenant not to compete, such employment contracts typically contain employer-sided attorney fee,
assignment, and choice of law provisions that further serve to constrain the employee. These contracts are generally presented
shortly after employment on a take it or leave it basis, when the
employee has little or no bargaining power. 8 Consequently, most
employees have little motivation or ability to decline to sign them
or to negotiate less onerous terms.
When an employee decides to leave a job, however, covenants
not to compete operate as significant impediments to future employment and may even prevent employees from becoming suc-9
cessfully self-employed. In addition to being sued for damages,

Covenants: A Unified Framework, 11 GEO. MASON L. REv. 357 (2002) [hereinafter Glick].
6.
See generally Frank B. Harty, Competition Between Employer and
Employee: Drafting and Enforcing Restrictive Covenants in Employment

Agreements, 35 DRAKE L. REv. 261 (1986). It should be noted that most covenants not to compete are drafted in a manner that restrict post-employment activities whether or not an employee is terminated or leaves employment under
their own volition.
7.
Rachel Arnow-Richman, The Role of Contract in The Modem Employment Relationship,10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 1, 5 (2003).
Rachel Arnow-Richman, Noncompetes, Human Capital, and Con8.
tract Formation: What Employment Law Can Learn from Family Law, 10 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REv. 155, 165-66 (2003).

Harty, supra note 6 at 285-86 (1986). Most litigation concerning
9.
covenants not to compete is between an employer seeking to enforce a covenant
and an employee at-will. An employment at-will is an agreement where an employee is retained for an unspecified period of time, and the employment is subject to termination by either party.

1999).

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 545 (7th ed.
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courts may issue injunctions that prohibit employees from engaging in conduct that violates non-competes.' 0 Employers can also
be held liable in hiring someone who violates an agreement with a
previous employer by, for example, sharing secrets, approaching
former customers, or simply for hiring such an employee."t
In
cases,
employers
can
recover
damages
from
both
the
former
some
employee and a new employer who has collaborated in the employee's transgressions. 12
This article analyzes the current state of Tennessee law concerning the enforceability of contractual restrictions on postemployment competition. In order to provide the appropriate public policy framework, a brief history of the development of covenants not to compete is presented in Part I. Part H is then followed by Parts III and IV, which set forth a selected analysis of the
law and policy of other jurisdictions in an effort to suggest improvement to Tennessee law. Part V concludes and offers specific
recommendations.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE

A. English Common Law Roots

During the Middle Ages, English courts found all restraints on
trade to be void and unenforceable, including post-employment
covenants not to compete.' 3 The common law reflected the prevailing public policy which was strongly influenced by the eco-4
nomic, labor, and cultural identity of the early guild system.'
10.
11.

Harty, supra note 9, at 288-90.
Id. at 288-89.

12.
13.

Id.
Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv.

L. REv. 625, 629 (1960).
14.
Id. at 634. Restraints on future employment were determined to be
void and unenforceable because they circumvented the customary rules of apprenticeship. During this period, a contractual relationship existed between the
master and the apprentice. The master agreed to provide training and a relatively low wage to the apprentice, typically for a period of seven years. At the
end of this period, the apprentice would be free to practice his trade as a journeyman, eventually becoming a master. Glick, supra note 5, at 360-61.
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During this period, English courts struck down restrictive employment covenants based on the laws and traditions of this system,1 5 as well as the desire to achieve commercial fairness and
economic independence.' 6 This trend continued even as the importance of the guild system declined, 17 due at least in part to a policy
shift which promoted free trade and encouraged individual initiative."
Freedom of contract emerged as capitalism became the predominant policy concern during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As a result, English courts began issuing decisions which
allowed limited restraints on trade. 19 One such case, Mitchel v.
Reynolds,20 established a new framework for analyzing restrictive
covenants and ushered in the application of what became known as
the "rule of reason" test for evaluating restrictive employment contracts as well. 21 Although the traditional rule remained that restraints on trade were on their face invalid, the court examined
whether "some essential economic or business purpose" existed

Blake, supra note 13, at 632.
15.
8 WILLIAM S. HOLDWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 56-57 (2d
16.
ed. 1937). See also Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment and the Rise of CorporateIntellectual Property, 1800-1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441,450-560 (2001).
17.
8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 16, § 2, at 56-61.
18.
Id. at 57.
19.
Blake, supra note 13, at 638 (discussing the "flood" of noncompete
cases reaching the English courts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711) (cited in Glick, supra note 5, at 366).
20.
21.
See 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 16, § 2, at 60-61 (discussing the fact
that Mitchel v. Reynolds marked "the true beginning of modem law on this subject"); Blake, supra note 13, at 639 (discussing how courts regularly refer to
Mitchel v. Reynolds as "the fundamental authority" to be applied). The defendant in Mitchel v. Reynolds assigned the lease of a bakehouse to the plaintiff.
Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at 347. Contemporaneously with the lease, the defendant
agreed not to operate a bakehouse himself within the same parish. Id. Although
the Mitchel court did not have before it a covenant incident to an employment
agreement, the court noted that its decision would likely change if it did. Id.
For such agreements are subject to "great abuses ... from masters, who are apt
to give their apprentices much vexation on this account, and to use many indirect practices to procure such bonds from them, lest they prejudice them in their
custom, when they come to set up for themselves." Id. at 350.

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 35

behind the agreement. 22 If the contract had such legitimate economic and business purposes and "appeared to be made upon good
and adequate consideration, ' ' 23 the covenant should be upheld so
and the circumstances surrounding
long as the terms of the contract
24
reasonable.
were
its making
Gradually the "rule of reason" test was reformulated by the
courts to include balancing the interests of the parties with the in25
In Homer v. Graves,26 the English court
terests of the public.
found that the element of reasonableness was not limited only to
the consideration stated in the contract, but also its potential impact
on the public welfare.27 On this point, the Homer court concluded
that, if a restrictive covenant within an employment agreement was
likely to cause undue injury to the public,28 the covenant should be
found unenforceable.
B. Development Within the United States

The development of the law of post-employment restraints in
the United States followed the nineteenth century English pattern.
Courts in America adopted the "rule of reason" test and the proposition that the law upholds restraints on trade if the restraints are
reasonable under the circumstances, 29 ancillary to a valid transac-

22.
Glick, supra note 5, at 365 (paraphrasing Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at
248,251-52).
23.
Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at 349.
24.
Glick, supra note 5, at 365. One important note about the Mitchel
decision is that its author, Lord Macclesfield, did not base his opinion on concepts of freedom of contract. Id. The determining factor was more likely
whether there was an inequality of bargaining power between the parties. Id.
(quoting Blake, supra note 13, at 637).
25.
Glick, supra note 5, at 366.
26. 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P. 1831).
Id. (holding that a 100 mile restriction imposed on a dentist appren27.
tice was unreasonable because the personal nature of dental services made it
impossible for such a wide area to be serviced by only the previous employer
himself).
28.
Id. For example, if the covenant was found to deprive the public of
needed services.
29.
See, e.g., Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
64 (1874). In order for a noncompetition agreement "to be reasonable, the pro-
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tion or relationship, 30 and limited in duration and geographic
scope. 31 Initially some courts were reluctant to enforce restraints
of trade that covered an entire state, 32 but this approach changed
with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Oregon Steam
Navigation Co. v. Winsor" in 1874.
Not only did the Winsor decision change the view that state
boundaries were the only relevant factor in determining the reasonableness of geographical limitations to covenants not to compete, 34 it also helped to firmly establish the "rule of reason" analysis when evaluating restraint of trade issues in American law. In
the era of Winsor, New York, Massachusetts and Rhode Island also
rendered decisions applying
a "rule of reason" analysis as it per35
boundaries.
tained to state
Although the common law of restraints of trade was imported
almost entirely from England to the United States, the industrial
revolution and the growing public perception of a "trust problem"
misee must have an interest worthy of protection;" therefore, such a restraint
must "be subsidiary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship that gives
rise to such an interest." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 187 cmt. b
(1981).
30.
See Blake, supra note 13, at 630-31, 637-46.
31.
See Pyke v. Thomas, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb) 486, 488 (1817); Pierce v.
Woodward, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 206, 206-08 (1828) (sale of grocery store
with verbal agreement not to compete within certain distance); Palmer v. Stebbins, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 188, 193 (1825) (exclusive agreement to carry all goods
of obligor and not encourage competition with boatman to carry.goods); Pierce
v. Fuller, 8 Mass. 223, 225 & n.[a] (1811) (purchase of stage line between Boston and Providence, Rhode Island); Nobles v. Bates, 7 Cow. 307, 309
(N.Y. 1827).
32.
See Taylor v. Blachard, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 370, 375 (1866); Lawrence v. Kidder, 10 Barb. 641, 655 (N.Y. App. Div. 1851).
33.
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64 (1874). The Court upheld a covenant that
a former steamship owner would not compete with its purchaser in the state
of California. Id. at 71. The Court reasoned that the covenant was reasonable,
even though its geographic scope encompassed an entire state, because "[iun
this country ...[sitate lines interpose such a slight barrier to social and business
intercourse." Id. at 67.
34.
See Blake, supra note 13, at 644.
35.
Id. (citing Morse Twist Drill & Mach. Co. v. Morse, 103 Mass. 73
(1869); Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419 (N.Y. 1887); Herreshoff v.
Boutineau, 19 A. 712, 713 (R.I. 1890) (dictum)).
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led to dissatisfaction with common law remedies which, in turn,
resulted in increasing pressure for congressional action. 36 In an
effort to circumvent price competition and deflation, firms engaged
37
in destructive competition by creating trusts and stock pools.
This concern led to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890,38 which
rendered illegal contracts in restraint of trade. 39 However, cases
that have analyzed restrictive covenants under the Sherman Act
have not departed appreciably from the common law precedent.4n4 1
In the 1898 case of United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co.,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that any restrictive covenant affecting interstate commerce that was unenforceable at
common law also violated the Sherman Act. 42 On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed this decision, 43 and, in a

Glick, supra note 5, at 369. "The primary flaw of the common law of
36.
restraints in controlling the trusts was that contractual privity was required for
standing (possessed only by the cartel members themselves) when the primary anticompetitive effect was borne by third parties (consumers and small
businesses)." Id.
37.
Id.
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current
38.
version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)).
39.
Id. Section one of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act states "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal." Id.
40.
See generally Milton Handler & Daniel E. Lazaroff, Restraint of
Trade and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 669
(1982).
41.
85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Addyston originated in the Eastern District of Tennessee. Id. at 271. In dictum, Judge Taft
(later Chief Justice) observed that if the contract had as its main purpose the
restriction of competition, the contract promoted a monopoly and was therefore
void, regardless of the reasonableness of the restraint. Id. at 282-83, 291 (dictum). However, if the covenant restraining trade was deemed ancillary to the
main contract, then the question of whether the restraint was unreasonable arose.
Id. at 282. If the restraint oppressed the covenantor without a corresponding
benefit upon the covenantee, or if the restraint suggested a monopoly, then the
contract was void. Id.
Id. at 278-79. The court noted the rule of reason test as articulated in
42.
Mitchel v. Reynolds. Id. at 279.
43.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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later opinion, affirmed the use of the rule of reason to evaluate the
impact of the challenged restraints on competitive conditions rather
than to inquire into the reasonableness of the challenged restraints."
III. OVERVIEW OF THE LAW OF COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
A. The Law in Tennessee

Following the establishment of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
the Tennessee legislature passed legislation, as did many other
states, based upon the Act to generally prohibit contracts restraining trade in interstate commerce and contracts which control the
price of a product. 45 Yet, in spite of federal and state legislation
prohibiting restraints in trade, both the federal courts 46 and the
Tennessee courts have refused to find covenants not to compete
containing
illegal per se, choosing instead to invalidate contracts
47
unreasonable.
found
when
only
such covenants

44.

Nat'l Soc'y of Prof I Eng'r v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688-92

(1978).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-101 (2004) states:
All arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between persons or corporations made with a view to
lessen, or which tend to lessen, full and free competition in the
importation or sale of articles imported into this state, or in the
manufacture or sale of articles of domestic growth or of domestic raw material, and all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between persons or corporations designed, or which tend, to advance, reduce, or control
the price or the cost to the producer or the consumer of any
such product or article, are declared to be against public policy, unlawful, and void.
Glick, supra note 5, at 410-11 notes:
46.
[A]I1 of the courts addressing the issue have held that covenants not to compete ancillary to either the sale of a business,
the sale of property, a partnership agreement, or a general employment contract are not illegal per se under the Sherman Act
and must be subjected to the rule of reason test.
45.

Id.
47.

Cesnick v. Chrysler Corp., 490 F. Supp. 859, 868 (M.D. Tenn. 1980)
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In 1966, the Tennessee Supreme Court in Allright Auto Parks,
Inc. v. Berry,48 reflecting the development of the rule of reason
analysis, established four factors relevant to determining whether a
covenant not to compete is reasonable under the particular circumstances:
(1) the consideration supporting the agreement;
(2) the threatened danger to the employer in the absence of
such an agreement;
(3) the economic hardship imposed on the employee by enforcing such a covenant; and
or not such a covenant should be adverse to the
(4) whether
49
public interest.

(holding an agreement between two corporations does not violate the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act where the corporation that sold one of its divisions agreed with
purchasing corporation not to rehire employees of division sold to other corporation if employees refused employment with purchaser); Ramsey v. Mutual Supply Co., 427 S.W.2d 849, 854 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968) (employment); Baird v.
Smith, 161 S.W. 492, 493 (Tenn. 1913) (sale of business). But see Herbert v.
W. G. Bush & Co., 298 S.W.2d 747, 751 (Tenn. 1957) (covenant not to compete
invalidated because covenant tended to lessen full and free competition in manufacture of brick in violation of Tennessee statute).
48.
409 S.W.2d 361 (Tenn. 1966).
49.
Id. at 463. The Allright court further intimated the following proviso:
There is no inflexible formula for deciding the ubiquitous
question of reasonableness, insofar as noncompetitive covenants are concerned. Each case must stand or fall on its own
facts. However, there are certain elements which should always be considered in ascertaining the reasonableness of such
agreements.
Id. at 363. This analysis is also consistent with that used by the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS:

(1) A promise to refrain from competition that imposes a restraint that is ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship is unreasonably in restraint of trade if
(a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee's legitimate interest, or
(b) the promisee's need is outweighed by the hardship to
the promisor and the likely injury to the public.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(1) (1981).

See also Greene

County Tire & Supply, Inc. v. Spurlin, 338 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tenn. 1960) (applying the rule of reason).
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While generally courts do not inquire into the adequacy of
consideration of a contract, 50 covenants not to compete are closely
scrutinized for basic contractual elements like consideration. 5' In
situations where the employment agreement is found not to be
supported by adequate consideration, a court may hold it unenforceable without further inquiry. In Tennessee, if an employee
signs a covenant not to compete before the employment actually
begins, the covenant is considered ancillary to the employment
agreement and the employment itself constitutes the required consideration. 52 However, problems concerning adequacy of consideration may arise if an at-will employee signs the covenant not to
compete after beginning work.53
The consideration issue was to some extent clarified in 1984,
in Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram.54 The Tennessee

Supreme Court held that agreements signed shortly after employment begins, as well as contemporaneously with the employment
agreement, were supported by adequate consideration. 55 This was
50.
51.

See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-50-103 (2004).
As the comment g to section 188 of the Restatement suggests:
Post-employment restraints are scrutinized with particular care
because they are often the product of unequal bargaining
power and because the employee is likely to give scant attention to the hardship he may later suffer through loss of his
livelihood. This is especially so where the restraint is imposed
by the employer's standardized printed form.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. g (1981).

See also Selox,

Inc. v. Ford, 675 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1984) (citing comment g with approval and weighing an employer's need to restrain competition against the
fairness of such a covenant to an employee).
Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 33 (Tenn.
52.
1984) (stating that "employment is sufficient consideration for a covenant which
is part of the original employment agreement"). See also Hasty v. Rent-ADriver, Inc., 671 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tenn. 1984) (reaffirming the principle that
employment itself may constitute sufficient consideration if made part of the
original employment agreement); Levy v. Baker, 528 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1973) (same).
53.
Selox, 675 S.W.2d at 474.
54.
678 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. 1984).
55.
Id. at 34. "[A] covenant signed prior to, contemporaneously with or
shortly after employment begins is part of the original agreement, and that therefore... is supported by adequate consideration." Id. at 33.
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a departure from previous case law established in Associated Dairies, Inc. v. Ray Moss Farms, Inc.,56 which held that continued employment did not serve as adequate consideration. 57 The Tennessee Supreme Court in Associated Dairiesreasoned that because the
employer was not obligated to retain the employee and that the
ememployee could cease work without a day's notice, continued
58
consideration.
necessary
the
constitute
not
did
ployment
The Ingram court, however, held that the mere promise of actual employment would not bind an at-will employee, but a covenant not to compete is binding if there is actual performance of the
promise through continued employment. 59 The court stated that
whether performance is actual consideration to support a covenant
not to compete depends on the facts and circumstances of the
case. Factors affecting whether consideration for a covenant not
to compete is reasonable include the length of employment and the
circumstances under which the employee leaves. 6 1 Although it
refused to decide what time period would constitute adequate consideration, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted in dictum that "[i]t
is possible, for instance, that employment for only a short period
62
would be insufficient consideration under the circumstances."
Once a court determines the existence of adequate consideration, it must evaluate the second element of the test, which is the
threatened danger to the employer in the absence of a covenant not
to compete. 63 Generally, employers are not entitled to protection
from ordinary competition. 64 While competition from former employees may harm a former employer, the employer by contract

56.
326 S.W.2d 458 (Tenn. 1959).
Id. at 460-61.
57.
58.
Id. at 461.
59.
Ingram, 678 S.W.2d at 34.
60.
Id. at 35.
Id. ("Although an at-will employee can be discharged for any reason
61.
without breach of the contract, a discharge which is arbitrary, capricious or in
bad faith clearly has a bearing on whether a court of equity should enforce a
non-competition covenant.").
Id.
62.
63.
Allright Auto Parks, Inc. v. Berry, 409 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tenn.
1996).
64.
Hasty v. Rent-A-Driver, Inc., 671 S.W.2d 471, 472-73 (Tenn. 1989).
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cannot restrain ordinary competition. 65 The employer must demonstrate the existence of special facts, over and above ordinary
competition, which would give the employee an unfair advantage
over the employer. 66 Courts will evaluate whether an employee
would have such an unfair advantage by looking to:
(1) whether the employer provided the employee
with specialized training; (2) whether the employee
is given access to trade or business information; and
(3) whether the employer's customers tend to associate the employers business with the employee due
to the employee's repeated contacts
with the cus67
tomers on behalf of the employer.
These considerations may operate individually6 or
in tandem to give
8
rise to a properly protectable business interest.
An employer, however, does not have a protectable interest in
an employee's general knowledge and skill. 69 This is true not only
with respect to that knowledge and skill that the employee brings
into the employment relationship, but also that which the employee
gains as a result of the employment, despite whether the employer
invested in expensive employee training.
A caveat may exist,
however, where "an employer may have a protectable interest in
the unique knowledge and skill that an employee receives through
special training by his employer, at least when such training is present along
with other factors tending to show a protectable inter1
est."

7

Employers do have a protectable business interest in their existing business relationships with customers, where an employee's
ongoing contacts with a particular customer have caused the cus65.
Id. at 473.
66.
Id.; see also Vantage Tech., L.L.C. v. Cross, 17 S.W.3d 637, 644
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
67.
Vantage Tech., 17 S.W.3d at 644 (citing Hasty, 671 S.W.2d at 472).
68.
Id.; see, e.g., AmeriGas Propane, Inc. v. Crook, 844 F. Supp. 379,
386 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
69.
Hasty, 671 S.W.2d at 473; Vantage Tech., 17 S.W.3d at 644.
70.
Vantage Tech., 17 S.W.3d at 645.
71.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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tomer to associate the employer's business with the individual employee. 72 Tennessee courts have also intimated that covenants will
be held reasonable where necessary to prevent former employees
from gaining an unfair advantage over their former employer
through the use of the latter's customer lists. 73 As one Tennessee
court recognized, good will is often created from relationships built
through ongoing contacts between a business's customers and its
employees.7 4
Tennessee courts will also protect an employer's information
from unauthorized disclosure or appropriation by a former employee where an employer establishes that such business information constitutes protectable trade secret or confidential information. 75 "[A] trade secret may consist of any 'formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business
and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not [know or] use it.' '

76

However, under Ten-

nessee law, "easily ascertainable information" is not protected as a
trade secret.7 7

At least one Tennessee court has applied the following factors
found in the Restatement of Torts, 78 when determining what constitutes a trade secret: (1) the extent to which the information is
known outside of an employer's business; (2) the extent to which
the information is known by employees and others involved in the
See, e.g., Hasty v. Rent-A-Driver, Inc., 671 S.W.2d 471, 472-73
72.
(Tenn. 1989); Matthews v. Barnes, 293 S.W. 993, 994 (Tenn. 1927).
73.
Hasty, 671 S.W.2d at 472 (citing E. L. Conwell & Co. v. Gutberlet,
429 F.2d 527, 528 (4th Cir. 1970)).
74.
Vantage Tech., 17 S.W.3d at 645. "Because this relationship arises
out of the employer's goodwill, the employer has a legitimate interest in keeping
the employee from using this relationship, or the information that flows
through it, for his own benefit." Id. at 646.
75.
Hasty, 671 S.W.2d at 473.
76.
Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. B & L Labs., Inc., 592 S.W.2d 583, 586
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1979) (internal citations ommitted in original). See also
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) ("It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing .... a pattern for a machine or other

device, or a list of customers.").
77.
Vantage Tech., 17 S.W.3d at 645 (citing Hickory Specialties, 592
S.W.2d at 587).
78.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
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employer's business; (3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the
information to the employer and to its competitors; (5) the amount
of effort or money expended by the employer in developing
the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the informa79
tion could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
Once the danger to the employer's protectable interests has
been assessed, the court will weigh the interests against the potential hardship imposed on the employee. 80 The employee's interests
include the ight to work, the right to be compensated for their labor, and economic freedom to move to another employer. Tennessee courts have given little guidance regarding how such a comparison should be made, with the exception that it should "depend
on the facts of the particular case. ' 81 It appears that the courts take
into consideration the fact that a covenant not to compete is often
the product of unequal bargaining power, and the extent of the restraint might not be realized by the employee at the inception of
the contract. 82 There is also support for the proposition that a court
should consider such factors as changes in job responsibilities and
85
compensation, 8386type of work, 84 an 87employee's family situation,
education level, ability to relocate and attempts to obtain other
employment 88 when determining whether to enforce a covenant not
to compete. 89
The final factor to be considered in analyzing the enforceability of a covenant not to compete is to determine its impact on the
79.
Baker v. Battershel, 1986 WL 7602, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 9,
1986) (citing Hollister, Inc. v. Tran-Sel., Inc., 223 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Tenn.
1963)).
80.
Selox, Inc. v. Ford, 675 S.W.2d 474, 475 (Tenn. 1984).
81.
Id. at 476.
82.
Id.; see supra text accompanying note 51.
83.
Selox, 675 S.W.2d at 475 (change in sales representatives compensation package).
84.
Kaset v. Combs, 434 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968) (operator of catering truck would be forced to move to another town).
85.
Levy v. Baker, 528 S.W.2d 558, 560-61 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).
86.
Id. at 560.
87.
Id.
88.
Id. at 560-61.
89.
See also Blake, supra note 13, at 685-86.
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public welfare. 90 An agreement which stifles competition is void if
injurious to the public interest. 91 The reasoning behind invalidating such agreements on public policy grounds is that they promote
the inefficient use of valuable resources. 92 The court should determine if the public is being denied an individual's valuable skills
or if the cost to the consumer is increased because of the constraint. 93 Tennessee courts, however, infrequently address this final factor. 94 Once they have balanced the employer's interest
against that of the95 employee, the courts rarely address the possible
injury to society.
Only recently has a Tennessee court seriously explored the potential injury to society factor in a covenant not to compete analysis. In Medical Education Assistance Corp. v. State ex rel.,96 the
Tennessee Court of Appeals held that a physician's covenant not to
compete against the faculty practice plan that had employed him
while he taught97at the medical school was enforceable on public
policy grounds.

90.
Allright Auto Parks, Inc. v. Berry, 409 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tenn.
1966).
91.
Bailey v. Master Plumbers, 52 S.W. 853, 855 (Tenn. 1899). See also
State v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Coop. Ass'n, 2 Tenn. App. 674, 685 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1926) ("When the restraint of trade is such only as will afford a fair
protection to the interest of the party in favor of whom it is given, and is not so
large or extensive as to interfere with the interest of the public, it will be sustained.").
92.
See generally Glick, supra note 5.
93. Id.
94.
But cf. Selox, Inc. v. Ford, 675 S.W.2d 474, 475 (Tenn. 1984) (noting
that the restraint is greater than needed, and "the employer's need is outweighed
by the hardship to employee and likely injury to the public"); Herbert v. W.G.
Bush & Co., 298 S.W.2d 747, 752 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957) (observing that the
public benefited substantially from invalidating covenant ancillary to sale of
business, while defendants suffered little hardship by nonenforcement).
95.
Blake, supra note 13, at 686.
96.
19 S.W.3d 803 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
97.
Id. at 816. The court explained:
Applying the public policy considerations and special circumstances of Tennessee medical schools as described above by
medical educators and administrators at ETSU to the facts of
this case, we agree with the Trial Court that the covenant is
enforceable against Dr. Mehta. We emphasize that this deci-
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The court found that the public interest was of paramount importance in resolving this dispute. 98
In addition to the above four factors outlined in Allright, Tennessee courts also require that the time and territorial limits of a
covenant not to compete be no greater than is necessary to protect
the legitimate business interests of the employer. 99 A broad covenant not to compete anywhere, versus a specific area, is void as
against public policy. 100 However, a contract not to compete at a
particular place or for a specific period of time is not invalid per se
or against public policy. 1 The omission of a time restriction will
not render the covenant unenforceable, 10 2 but, instead, the courts

sion is limited to the facts of this particular case, and that each
situation must be decided on its own merits. The involvement
of ETSU, Quillen College of Medicine, as a named third party
beneficiary of the covenant not to compete, was crucial to both
the Trial Court's and our determination that the covenant not
to compete should be enforced against Dr. Metha. This is not a
situation where a physician leaves a purely private practice
group and proceeds to compete against that private practice
group. We express no opinion whether or not the public's interest would mandate the enforcement or non-enforcement of
a covenant not to compete involving a physician's leaving his
private practice group to compete against that private practice
group.
Id.
98.
Id. The court acknowledged that the covenant not to compete was
signed in 1986, prior to the enactment of TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-204 in 1997.
The current version of this statute provides that covenants not to compete are
enforceable against physicians employed by faculty practice plans. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 63-6-204(e) (2004). Although the court refused to apply this statute to
the defendant retroactively, they held the covenant not to compete enforceable
on public policy grounds after a thorough analysis of the competing public policy claims. Med. Educ. Assistance Corp., 19 S.W.3d at 816.
99.
Allright Auto Parks, Inc. v. Berry, 409 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tenn.
1966); Vantage Tech., L.L.C. v. Cross, 17 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1999).
100. Turner v. Abbott, 94 S.W. 64, 66 (Tenn. 1906); George & Chapman
v. E. Tenn. Coal Co., 83 Tenn. 455, 458 (Tenn. 1885).
101.
George & Chapman, 83 Tenn. at 455.
102. Federated Mut. Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 382
S.W.2d 214, 218 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964).
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will supply a reasonable time period. 0 3 What a court considers a
reasonable period depends on the facts and circumstances of each
case. Where the objective is to protect customer relationships, the
period should be limited to that required to replace the employee
and allow the employers to prove their effectiveness to their customers. 0 4 When the focus of protection is confidential information or trade secrets, it should be limited in time by the business
significance of the covenant. 105 In deciding the reasonableness of
the duration of the restriction, courts will also determine the length
the risk of harm from competition to
of time necessary to diminish
06
1
the former employer.
Likewise, the territorial restriction should only be as broad as
necessary to allow the employer to protect its customers from appropriation by its former employee. 107 As a practical matter, this
should limit the territorial scope to those areas where the employee
customer-contact
had customer contact. 10 8 This is based on 1the
09
interests.
protectable
theory of the employer's
Although Tennessee courts have upheld covenants not to
compete which restricted former employees from conducting a
competing business in territories in which they had no direct cus-

Id.
103.
Blake, supra note 13, at 678.
104.
Id.
105.
See, e.g., Vantage Tech., L.L.C. v. Cross, 17 S.W.3d 637, 648 (Tenn.
106.
Ct. App. 1999) (upholding three year restriction); Ramsey v. Mutual Supply Co.,
427 S.W.2d 849, 853 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968) (upholding five year noncompetition); Johnson, 382 S.W.2d at 218 (covenant restricting employee from doing
business in territory for two years). But see Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., v.
Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 36 (Tenn. 1984) (holding two-year covenant not to
compete unreasonable and enforced only one year); Baker v. Hooper, 50 S.W.3d
463 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a six month restraint on competition
was unreasonable and unduly burdensome on former employee nail technicians
because nail care is high maintenance field where customers ordinarily have
appointments twice per month and as such time restriction was reduced to two
months).
Allight Auto Parks, Inc. v. Berry, 409 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tenn.
107.
1966).
Id. at 364.
108.
Id.
109.
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tomer contact, 110 the Tennessee Supreme Court in Ingram limited
such a broad scope of territorial limitations."ll The supreme court
adopted in Ingram the rule of reasonableness which allows judicial
modification of the time and territorial restraints when a court determines that an otherwise enforceable covenant not to compete
exists. 11 2 If the scope of the covenant is reasonable, it will be enforced as written. 113 However, if the scope is unnecessarily burdensome to the employee, it will be enforced only "to the
extent that [it is] reasonably necessary to protect the employer's
interest without imposing undue hardship on the employee when
the public interest is not adversely affected."' 14 This rule has subsequently been applied by the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Vantage Tech.115 to reform the territorial limitations imposed on the
former employee.116
B. The FederalLaw

Federal courts first began analyzing post-employment covenants not to compete under the Sherman Act during the late
1950s. 117 Previously, the federal courts had applied a state court
110.
See William B. Tanner Co. v. Taylor, 530 S.W.2d 517, 522 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1974) (reasoning that since the former employer conducted business in
forty-eight states, and the former employee was now in direct competition, that
the scope of the restraint was reasonable); Ramsey, 427 S.W.2d at 853 ("[Tlhe
territorial scope of a restrictive covenant not to compete is reasonable, although
it covers territory in which the employee at the time of termination of the con.tract of employment had no business contact, if it could be reasonably anticipated that such territory might be within his coverage at some period during
employment.").
111.
Ingram, 678 S.W.2d at 28.
112.
Id. at 36-37. The court discusses the advantages and limitations of
the "all or nothing rule" and the "blue pencil rule," as applied in other jurisdictions, before adopting the rule of reasonableness as the approach to be applied
by Tennessee courts in reforming time and territorial restraints. Id. at 37.
Id.
113.
Id. (quoting Ehlers v. Iowa Warehouse Co., 188 N.W.2d 368, 370
114.
(Iowa 1971)).:
115. Vantage Tech., L.L.C. v. Cross, 17 S.W.3d 637 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1999).
116.
Id. at 647.
117. Glick, supra note 5, at 408. See, e.g., Tri-Cont'l Fin. Corp. v. Tropi-
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type analysis focusing on the reasonableness of restrictions imposed in terms of duration and scope and did not address the issue
of consumer harm. 118 It was not until the mid to late 1970s that
federal courts began to determine that covenants not to compete
ancillary to a valid transaction were not illegal per se under the
1 19
Sherman Act and must apply the full rule of reason analysis.
More modem decisions have focused on the need to clearly "define
the relevant market and determine market power as part of the
overall assessment of anticompetitive" behavior.' 20 Once a court

cal Mar. Enters., 265 F.2d 619, 624-25 (5th Cir. 1959) (upholding covenant
restricting use of shipping vessel and effectively restricting competition as a
reasonable restriction ancillary to a valid sale of real property).
118.
Glick, supra note 5, at 409.
119.
Id. at 410-11. See generally Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776
F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying traditional rule of reason analysis and upholding covenant not to compete in building lease and purchase agreements
between large appliance dealer and building supplies dealer sharing the
same building); Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1983) (upholding post-employment covenant not to compete entered into at termination
of employment finding that no anticompetitive effect of agreement was shown);
Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1977) (upholding
covenant not to compete contained in brokerage firm's partnership agreement
holding that agreement had legitimate purpose and was reasonable and not overbroad); United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976) (upholding numerous covenants not to compete in gas company's employment
contracts against Government's claims of illegality holding that there was no
indication of attempts or success in monopolizing the liquid petroleum gas market and that the covenants were reasonable and served legitimate purposes);
Sound Ship Bldg. Corp. v. Bethelem Steel Corp., 387 F. Supp. 252 (D. N.J.
1975) (upholding covenant ancillary to sale of harbor front property that forbid
certain ship building and repair activity finding that covenant was reasonable
under rule of reason test).
120.
Glick, supra note 5, at 412. See, e.g., Newburger, 563 F.2d at 108283 (noting adverse effects covenants not to compete could potentially have on
labor market, stating that "[w]hen a company interferes with free competition
for one of its former employee's services, the market's ability to achieve the
most economically efficient allocation of labor is impaired," and that "employee-noncompetition clauses can tie up industry expertise and experience and
thereby forestall new entry," but holding that "[in] certain cases, post employment restraints do serve legitimate business purposes," and recognizing the need
to look at the actual effects of the agreement on competition in assessing its
legality under the Sherman Act).
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finds that the covenant not to compete has the potential for an adverse effect within a relevant market, or that the covenantee has
sufficient market influence to reasonably affect competition
the court then analyzes the reasonableness of
through the covenant,
21
the agreement.'
This analytical framework was applied in Consultants & Designers, Inc. v. Butler Service Group, Inc., 122 a case in which the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a covenant not to compete after analyzing it under the rule of reason test.1 23 The court
determined that the questions of relevant market and market power
must be "resolved as a unit."' 124 The Eleventh Circuit in Butler
Service concluded that Butler's restrictive covenant had an impact
on competition, but it also had the effect of putting the employer at
a competitive disadvantage.125 The court further decided that there
was no real possibility of the covenant having an anticompetitive
effect on consumers; thus, the restraint could not violate section
one of the Sherman Act. 126 As a result, the holding of the district
Glick, supra note 5,at 413 states:
When a court finds a covenant not to compete to have an adverse impact on the relevant market, or when the court finds a
defendant has sufficient market power to reasonably effect
competition through the covenant, the court then analyzes the
actual reasonableness of the agreement. Under this part of
the test, the covenants must be no "greater than necessary to
afford protection to the parties and not so extensive as to interfere with the interests of the public."
Id. at 413 (quoting Sound Ship, 387 F. Supp. at 255).
122.
720 F.2d 1553 (11 th Cir. 1983). Butler Service involved interesting
facts. Butler Service Group (Butler) was contracted by the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) to provide engineering and design workers for TVA's nuclear
power plant program. Id. at 1556. When the agreement expired, TVA decided
to use Consultants & Designers, Inc. (C & D), to provide the needed workers. C
& D then sought to solicit Butler's TVA employees. Id. The issue before the
court was the effect to be given a covenant found in Butler's contract with TVA
that restricted employees retained by Butler from working for TVA for ninety
days following expiration of Butler's agreement. Id.
Butler Service, 720 F.2d at 1557 (citing Allright Auto Parks, Inc. v.
123.
Berry, 409 S.W.2d 361 (Tenn. 1966)).
124.
Id. at 1562.
Id. at 1562-64.
125.
Id. at 1564.
126.
121.
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court that the covenant not to compete was unenforceable under
state law was reversed.127 It appears that the federal courts have
departed somewhat from the traditional state court rule of reason
analysis of "covenants not to compete and have instead turned to a
more sophisticated antitrust analysis."'' 28 While the state courts
focus on harm to the contracting parties and the scope and duration
their focus toward
of the restraint, the federal courts have turned 129
preventing consumer harm in a relevant market.
The federal antitrust analysis should be instructive to state
courts, like Tennessee, which have an antitrust statute similar to
the Sherman Act. It seems entirely appropriate for state courts to
adopt this analytical framework to determine if a covenant not to
compete has an adverse effect within a relevant market prior to
applying the rule of reason. This analysis would ensure that the
state courts would weigh not only the competing claims of the contracting parties but the impact on the consumer in the relevant
market as well.
C. The Law in Other States
Individual state law regarding post-employment covenants has
not evolved in unison, 130 with some states addressing the issue
legislatively and some entirely through the common law.131 While
the majority of state courts follow the basic framework first set out
in Mitchel v. Reynolds, 132 enforcing covenants not to compete if
reasonable, the law in some states has become distinctive, due either to judicial decision or legislative pronouncement. 133 California, for example, takes a very restrictive enforcement approach,

127.
128.
129.

Id.
Glick, supra note 5, at 417.
Id.

130.

Matthew W. Finkin, Law Reform American Style: Thoughts on a

Restatement of the Law of Employment, 18 LAB. LAW. 405, 413 (2003).
131.
Id.
24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
132.
Jason S. Wood, A Comparison of the Enforceability of Covenants Not
133.
to Compete and Recent Economic Histories of FourHigh Technology Regions, 5
VA. J.L. & TECH. 14, 16 (2000).
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voiding all covenants not to compete,' 34 as compared to South Dakota which has adopted a much broader methodology, approving
covenants not to compete in most instances where the time frame
is less than two years.' 35 Although it may appear that the question
of enforceability of covenants not to compete is a black and white
issue, a closer analysis suggests a wide spectrum of enforcement
possibilities, with most states falling somewhere between the two
extremes. 36 In those states where the law governing covenants not
to compete has been developed through the common law, courts
have struggled with the application of traditional contract law doctrine to the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Because
courts have used equitable concepts to avoid the harsh results of
contract law principles, contract-based predictability has been sacrificed.137 As a result, over time, each state has developed its own

134.
Section 16600 of the California Business & Professional Code provides that "[e]xcept as provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone
is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind
is to that extent void." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2004). Few
states follow the approach taken in California. 54A AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies
and Restraintson Trade § 931 (2004).
South Dakota law provides:
135.
An employee may agree with an employer at the time of employment or at any time during his employment not to engage
directly or indirectly in the same business or profession as that
of his employer for any period not exceeding two years from
the date of termination of the agreement and not to solicit existing customers of the employer within a specified county, first or
second class municipality, or other specified area for any period
not exceeding two years from the date of termination of the
agreement, if the employer continues to carry on a like business
therein.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 53-9-11 (2004). For further discussion on this
topic, see Benjamin Aaron & Matthew Finkin, The Law of Employee Loyalty in
the United States, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 321, 325 (1999).
136.
See generally BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, COVENANTS NOT TO
COMPETE: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Samuel M. Brock, III & Arnold H.
Pedowitz eds., 3d ed. 2004) (providing an overview of each state's laws regulating noncompetition agreements).
137.
M. Scott McDonald, Noncompete Contracts: Understandingthe Cost
of Unpredictability,10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 137 (2003).
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set of rules concerning how post-employment covenants are enforced.
For example, whether continued employment of an at-will
employee is sufficient consideration to support a covenant not to
compete entered into after the employment relationship has begun
is an issue that is answered differently in a number of jurisdictions. 138 Common law contract analysis applied to the restrictive
covenant context would require mutual assent to the terms of the
agreement by the parties and the existence of consideration. 139
Continued employment is deemed consideration because the employer is refraining from exercising a legal privilege to terminate
the employment. For those jurisdictions that prohibit covenants
1 40
not to compete by statute, adequate consideration is not an issue.
However, a number of states adhere to the rule that continued employment standing alone does not provide consideration to support
a covenant entered into after the inception of the employment relationship. 141 These courts appear to require additional consideration
138.
MALSBERGER, supra note 136, at xxv, c. (providing an index that
guides the reader to the relevant state law on this issue).
139.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states:
(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a return
promise must be bargained for.
(2) A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by
the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee
in exchange for that promise.
(3) The performance may consist of
(a) an act other than a promise, or
(b) a forbearance, or
(c) the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1)-(3) (1981).
140.
See 54A Am. JUR. 2D, supra note 134, for a discussion of jurisidictions that prohibit covenants not to compete by statute.
141.
Mona Electric Group v. Truland Service Corp., 193 F. Supp. 2d 874,
876 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding that continuation of employment for even a substantial period of time does not, standing alone, provide consideration for restrictive covenant executed after the inception of employment); Dick v. Dick,
355 A.2d 110 (Conn. 1974) (holding that the rationale is that past consideration
cannot support the imposition of a new obligation); Freeman v. Duluth Clinic,
334 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn. 1983) (holding that continuation of employment
alone can be used to uphold coercive agreements, but the agreement must be
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to ensure that the restrictive covenant was truly a bargained for
agreement. While there are a handful of states that have not addressed this issue at all, the majority follow the rule adopted by
Tennessee in Central Adjustment Bureau v. Ingram, recognizing
continued employment and receipt of additional benefits, as providing the required consideration. 142 Even under this enforcement
is dependent
approach, however, the sufficiency of consideration
143
on the "facts and circumstances of each case."
The question of whether courts are permitted to modify an
overbroad covenant not to compete is also an issue that varies
across jurisdictional lines. 144 Although courts generally refrain
from substituting their judgment for that of the contracting parties,
in the context of an otherwise reasonable covenant not to compete,
they may modify the geographical, time or activity restraints. Such

bargained for and provide the employee with real advantages); Forrest Paschal
Mach. Co. v. Milholen, 220 S.E.2d 190, 196 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975) (observing
that when the relationship of employer and employee is already established
without a restrictive covenant, any agreement thereafter not to compete must be
in the nature of a new contract based upon new consideration); Citadel Broad.
Co. v. Gratz, 52 Pa. D. & C. 4th 534 (Pa. Com. P1. 2001) (noting that when a
noncompetition clause is "injected into an existing employment relationship, [it]
is enforceable only if the employee received some corresponding benefit or
change in status"); Labriola v. Pollard Group, Inc., 100 P.3d 791, 796 (Wash.
2004) (en banc) (requiring "independent consideration ...at the time promises
are made for a noncompete agreement when employment has already commenced"); PEMCO Corp. v. Rose, 257 S.E.2d 885, 889 (W. Va.. Ct. App. 1979)
(applying Virginia Law and noting that when the relationship of employer and
employee is established without a covenant not to compete, any agreement
thereafter not to compete must be based on new consideration); NBZ, Inc. v.
Pilarski, 520 N.W.2d 93, 97 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that continued employment is not sufficient consideration to support a covenant not to compete
when the employee is still in training); Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc.,
861 P.2d 531, 541 (Wyo. 1993) (holding that a covenant not to compete made
during the employment relationship cannot be supported by continued employment, it must be supported by separate consideration given contemporaneously
with the making of the covenant).
142.
Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 34-35
(Tenn.1984).
143.
Id. at 35.
144. See MALSBERGER, supra note 136, at xxvi, 4. (providing an index
that guides the reader to the relevant state law on this issue).

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 35

limitations are designed to prevent the former employee from
competing with the former employer within a given market. The
primary focus of such a limitation is to prevent the former employee from using confidential information or soliciting customers
that fairly belong to the former employer.
Courts have tended to apply one of three approaches to this
modification issue: (1) the all or nothing rule, (2) the blue pencil
rule, or (3) the rule of reasonableness. 145 Under the "all or nothing
rule" the court either enforces the contract as written or voids it in
its entirety. 146 Courts that employ this rule reason that courts
should not have the authority to make private agreement when
covenants prove excessive. 147 This rule has an effect which encourages the drafter of the covenant not to compete to be very specific about the desired prohibited activities, clearly tying them to a
rational time and geographical limitation.
"The 'blue pencil rule' [advocates] that an unreasonable restriction against competition may be modified and enforced to the
extent that a grammatically meaningful reasonable restriction remains after the words making the restriction unreasonable are
stricken."' 14 8 This is a simple mechanism to apply, and it prevents
the courts from rewriting the agreement; however, it is often criticized for emphasizing form over substance. 149 If the covenant not
to compete contains a severability clause, the court can enforce the
lawful portion of the agreement and ignore the unreasonable part.
The court will not, however, add terms or rewrite provisions.
Although a small number of states have not addressed this issue or have not formally adopted a rule, the vast majority of states
apply the "rule of reasonableness" or some variation, when reforming the geographical and temporal restraints of a covenant not to
compete.150 This rule allows the court to modify the covenant not

145.
Ingram, 678 S.W.2d at 36-37.
146.
Id. Arkansas, California, North Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin
apply this rule. MALSBERGER, supra note 136, at 464, 517, 2598, 3339.
Ingram, 678 S.W.2d at 36-37.
147.
148.
Id. Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Missouri,
Rhode Island and South Carolina apply this rule. MALSBERGER, supra note 136,
at 425,579,627, 987, 1403, 1752, 2882, 2918.
149. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d at 37.
150.
See MALSBERGER, supra note 136, at 347, 676, 783, 1139, 1225,
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to compete in order to reduce the geographical limitations of the
agreement, limit the activities of the former employee, or limit
their contact with certain customers in order to protect the legitimate interests of the former employer. The courts may also reduce the timeframe of the restraint or void the contract in its entirety if practical business considerations so dictate.
The "rule of reasonableness," which was adopted by Tennessee in Ingram, allows the courts to enforce covenants not to compete to the extent necessary to protect the employer's interest without imposing an undue hardship on the employee or adversely affecting the public.1 51 In the absence of bad faith by the employer,
this approach, in theory, allows for partial enforcement of the
terms that the parties intended. 152 This is particularly true when
the agreement contains a severability clause and specifically allows
for judicial modification. 153 This rule, however, does not provide
an employee with any prospective guidance on how a particular
covenant not to compete will be enforced absent litigating the issue. 154

Each jurisdiction has also developed rules addressing such
other varied topics as choice of law, burden of proof, damages,
assignment, attorneys' fees, to name a few, that have been borrowed from other areas of state law and applied to the restrictive
covenant context. In the absence of clear legislative direction, it
appears that many state courts have applied these rules as an aid in
resolving the particular issue before them, rather than as a reflection of the desired public policy position of the state.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The purpose, application, and effect of post-employment
covenants not to compete have been a much debated topic in legal
scholarship for many years. They have been analyzed from the

1503, 1564, 1623, 1720, 1796, 1855, 1923, 1965, 2009, 2240, 2351, 2532, 2648,
2713, 2752, 2802, 2955, 2994, 3263, 3303.
151. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d at 37.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154.

See id.
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perspective of agency law, 155 contract law, 156 employment and labor law, 157 family law,158 intellectual property law, 159 law and economics,' and statistics. 61 All make a valuable contribution to the
body of knowledge surrounding the law of covenants not to compete and all suggest if not explicitly, implicitly, that the particular
approach adopted is highly dependent on the type of public policy
the particular jurisdiction wants to promote.
A recent article by Ronald Gilson examines the comparative
success of the Silicon Valley high technology industrial district
and the failure of Route 128 outside of Boston, which resulted
from different patterns of inter-firm employee mobility.1 62 The
underlying research indicated that the Silicon Valley exhibited a
greater pace of turnover among skilled employees and entrepreneurs, which was attributed to cultural differences between Cali-

155.
See Phillip J. Closius & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current Judicial Enforcement of Employee Covenants Not to Compete-A ProposalforReform, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 531,533 (1984).
156.
See M. Scott McDonald, Noncompete Contracts: Understanding the
Cost of Unpredictability, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 137 (2003); Franklin G.
Snyder, The PerniciousEffect of Employment Relationships on the Law of Contracts, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 33 (2003); Kathryn J. Yates, Consideration
for Employee Noncompetition Covenants In Employments At Will, 54 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1123 (1986).
157.
See Aaron & Finkin, supra note 135, at 321; Finkin, supra note 130,
at 405.
158.
See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Noncompetes, Human Capital, and
Contract Formation: What Employment Law Can Learn From Family Law, 10
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 155 (2003).
159.
See Benjamin A. Emmert, Keeping Confidence with FormerEmployees: California Courts Apply the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine to California
Trade Secret Law, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1171 (2000); Catherine L. Fisk,
Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment and
the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800-1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441,
450-560 (2001); Richard R. Mainland, Contracts Limiting Competition By Former Employees: A California Law Perspective, 340 PLI/PAT 119 (1992).
160.
See Glick, supra note 5; Wood, supra note 133, at 16.
161.
Peter J. Whitemore, A StatisticalAnalysis of Noncompetition Clauses
in Employment Contracts, 15 J. CORP. L. 483,485 (1990).
162.
Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology IndustrialDistricts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74
N.Y.U. L. REv. 575 (1999).
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fornia and Massachusetts employees. 163 This mobility resulted in
an increase in the pace of technological change and product inno164
vation through the rapid dissemination of ideas and knowledge.
The author contends that one potential explanation for the difference in employee mobility is that post-employment covenants not
to compete areprohibited
in California while they are enforced in
65
Massachusetts.
Gilson acknowledges that the California statute, 16 6 which invalidates noncompetition clauses in employment agreements, came
about through historical chance rather than as a byproduct of
thoughtful public policy deliberation. 167 He also cautions other
jurisdictions against trying to emulate Silicon Valley's success by
legislatively creating the legal infrastructure which prohibits covenants not to compete. 168 Nevertheless, there appears to be some
evidence that limiting the use of such restrictions may enhance the
dissemination of knowledge and ideas through rapid employee and
entrepreneurial mobility, thus creating an environment for technological and economic growth. 169 However, the same result may be
accomplished through the application of the rule of reason. 170 As
Gilson states it, "[in] assessing the validity of a particular covenant
under this legal regime, a court balances against the employer's
interest in enforcing the covenant not only the employee's interest
163.
Id. at 578.
164.
Id.
165.
Id.
166.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2004).
167.
Gilson, supra note 162, at 613-18.
168.
Id. at 627. Like all states, California law does not protect employees
who reveal trade secrets. Id. at 596-602.
169.
See id. 627-28. One commentator has analyzed the enforcement of
covenants not to compete along side the recent histories of four high technology
regions and suggests the following factors as contributing to the success of Silicon Valley: (1) Unprecedented national economic growth during the time Gilson's study was conducted obscured the alleged advantage procured by regions
disfavoring covenants not to compete; (2) Low unemployment rates allowed
employees to change jobs more easily, thus providing the imperative knowledge
spillovers needed for regional growth; and (3) State and local leaders made concerted efforts to reproduce the network effects and knowledge spillovers seen in
Silicon Valley on a smaller scale. Wood, supra note 133, at 59-64.
170.
Gilson, supra note 162, at 628.
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in mobility, but also the public interest."' 171 This approach allows
the courts to consider the public interest in a particular industry
and allows the parties to present expert testimony concerning the
potential costs and benefits of imposing such restraints on the dissemination of knowledge within that industry.172 Such an approach
173
is more analogous to that which is applied in the federal courts.
The efficient transfer of knowledge also has an impact on the
rule of reason test when considering time and geographical restraints. More precisely, the "technology boom" is making it increasingly difficult for courts to enforce these covenants' time and
174
geographical restrictions that were once considered reasonable.
A number of reasons explain this phenomenon. First, a business
that utilizes the world wide web to advertise its goods or services is
able to contact a potentially infinite number of customers on a nationwide or even global basis.' 7 5 However, public policy considerations, as well as established rules of law, should preclude a
court from enforcing a geographical restriction that prevents a
former employee from communicating with such a dispersed clientele. 1" 6 Second, the rapid pace at which business technology is
evolving causes information an employee acquires on the job to be
rendered obsolete in a shorter period of time. 177 Consequently,
traditional time restrictions are no longer feasible in the context of
high-tech business enterprises, (or even low-tech companies that
apply such techniques) because such a durational restraint would

171.
Id.
172.
See id.
173.
As discussed earlier, federal courts assess whether a covenant not to
compete has an adverse effect to the public interest by first defining the relevant
market and then determining market power within that particular market as part
of the overall assessment of anticompetitive behavior. This approach would
invite the courts to also determine what real impact the restrictive covenant
would have on the knowledge base of a particular iustry,

and whether such

restriction is in the public interest.
174.
Todd M. Foss, Texas, Covenants Not to Compete and the TwentyFirst Century: Can the Pieces Fit Together in a Dot.Corn Business World?, 3
Hous. Bus. & TAx L.J. 207, 225 (2003).
175.
Id. at 225-26.

176.
177.

Id. at 226.
Id. at 226-27.
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not only unduly burden the employee
but also restrict the free flow
78
of human capital in the market. 1
Against this contextual backdrop, it is valuable to reflect on
Tennessee's current public policy as it applies to covenants not to
compete. In the absence of any formal declaration by the legislature on this issue, we look to the courts to articulate this philosophy. In 1984, the Tennessee Supreme Court announced in Hasty v.
Rent-A-Driver, Inc., 179 that covenants not to compete "are not favored in Tennessee because they are in restraint of trade."' 180 However, a subsequent decision issued by the same court just three
months later has had a far more pervasive de facto impact on Tennessee's public policy as it pertains to such covenants. In Central
Adjustment Bureau v. Ingram,18 1 the Court ruled that "a covenant signed prior to, contemporaneously with or shortly after employment begins is part of the original agreement, and that therefore... it is supported by adequate consideration. ' 82 In this decision, the Court also announced the adoption of the "rule of reasonableness," which allows the court to modify the terms of "covenants not to compete to the extent that they
are reasonably neces' 83
interests."'
sary to protect the employer's
The purpose of this Article is not to argue against the court's
reasoning on this issue, but to highlight some of the unintended
consequences of the decision, and its corresponding impact on
Tennessee's public policy on an individual's right to work. As a
practical matter, Ingram has the immediate effect of placing the
interests of the employer above that of the employee.
To better illustrate the practical considerations of this inequality, I present the following scenario. As noted earlier, the covenant
not to compete is typically presented as a form contract to an employee sometime after employment begins on a take it or leave it
basis. 184 The employee has already terminated his relationship
178.
Id. at 227.
179.
671 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1984).
180. Id. at 472.
181.
678 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. 1984).
182.
Id. at 33.
183. Id. at 37.
184.
See Selox, Inc. v. Ford, 675 S.W.2d 474, 475-76 (Tenn. 1984) (discussing the bargaining strengths of employees relative to employers).
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with the former employer and, unless they are independently
wealthy, they have little or no bargaining power to negotiate less
onerous terms. The employee is proficient in his job and receives
increases in salary and training which reflect this. Under Tennesbeen supplied for the covenant not to
see law, consideration has 85
compete to be enforceable.'
The employee now wants to change jobs or start a new business, either because the present position has limited career growth
possibilities, the conditions of employment have changed through
merger or market constraints, or he has the opportunity to take on
additional challenges with additional compensation with another
employer. Because the employment agreement was not truly a
bargained-for agreement,' 86 it is only now that the employee realizes that the covenant not to compete in his employment agreement
may stifle his mobility. In addition to a broad restriction not to
attorney fee and an
compete with the former employer, there is an 187
contract.
the
in
contained
assignment provision
The former employer notifies the employee of its intent to
hold them to the agreement. The former employer contacts the
prospective or new employer and suggests that the subsequent employer may suffer potential liability for hiring the employee. The

185.

Ingram, 678 S.W.2d at 33.

186.
"Courts requiring evidence of a traditional bargain stress that covenants signed soon after the start of employment are not supported by consideration." Kathryn J. Yates, Considerationfor Employee Noncompetition Covenants
in Employments at Will, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 1123, 1137 (1986).

187.

Christopher J. Soller & Benjamin J. Sweet, Assignability of Non-

Compete Covenants, 74 PA. BAR ASS'N Q. 64 (2003). As Soller and Benjamin

explain:
Under traditional contract law principles, most rights are
freely assignable, absent contractual provisions prohibiting
such assignment. Recent case law suggests, however, that
where the parties do not address assignability in the agreement, non-compete covenants may not be freely assignable to
successor parties. Other courts require the employee to consent to the assignment before an assignee may legally enforce
a non-compete covenant. In the absence of clear evidence of
consent these courts have refused to enforce non-compete
covenants.
Id. (citations omitted).
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former employer may even file for a temporary restraining order or
injunction in addition to filing a suit for breach of contract. Regardless of whether the new employer rescinds the offer of employment, the employee is facing a substantial economic dilemma.
Not only will there be a cost to hiring an attorney to defend the
action, but the employee faces the very real possibilities that he or
she will be forced to pay the former employer's costs and attorneys
fees if the employee is unsuccessful in defending the action. The
former employer knows that if it can successfully prosecute the
claim, its other employees will not risk leaving. After being informed that court proceedings may take a year or longer to resolve
the issue, the former employee backs down, and either moves
away, or takes a job outside his career field in order to avoid the
dispute. This hypothetical plays out in reality more often than one
would imagine. Legal action, or threats of such action occur routinely, whether or not there is genuine concern by the former employer of unfair competition
Although the majority opinion in Ingram recognized the potential for a former employer abusing its power over the employee,' 88 it is doubtful that they foresaw the potential chilling effect that the decision could have on potential employee mobility
and thus on economic and technological growth.189 The dissent
188.

Ingram, 678 S.W.2d at 37. The Ingram court explained:

We recognize the force of the objection that judicial modification could permit an employer to insert oppressive and unnecessary restrictions into a contract knowing that the courts can
modify and enforce the covenant on reasonable terms. Especially when the contract allows the employer attorney's fees,
the employer may have nothing to lose by going to
court, thereby provoking needless litigation.
Id.
189.

Scholars commented:

[Tlhe number of litigated and reported cases may represent
only a small percentage of the actual number of employment
restrictions currently in force. Regardless of their validity and
enforceability, covenants not to compete chill the free movement of employees and eliminate competition among actual
and potential employers.
Phillip J. Closius & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current
JudicialEnforcement of Employee Covenants Not to Compete-A Proposalfor
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however, at least had a glimpse at this potential harm. 19 ° Justice
Brock, writing for the dissent, observed:
For every covenant that finds its way to court, there
are thousands which exercise an in terrorem effect
on employees who respect their contractual obligations and on competitors who fear legal
complications if they employ a covenator, or who
are anxious to maintain gentlemanly relations with
their competitors. Thus, the mobility of untold
numbers of employees is restricted by the intimidation of restrictions whose severity no court
would sanction. If severance is generally applied,
employers can fashion truly ominous covenants
with confidence that they will be pared down and
enforced when the facts of a particular case are not
having one's emunreasonable. This smacks of
1 91
too.
it
eating
and
cake,
ployee's
It has been over twenty years since the Tennessee Supreme
Court has addressed a post-employment covenant not to compete
case. 192 Given the passage of time and the benefit of experience of
what has taken place both in other jurisdictions and within the
lower courts in Tennessee, might it not be time for a change in
Tennessee's treatment of covenants not to compete? At the very
least should we not explore the opportunity to level the playing
field between employer and employee, and perhaps improve the
labor market and economic efficiency of resolving such disputes?' 93

Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 531, 532 (1984).
190.
Ingram, 678 S.W.2d at 39 (3-2 decision).
191.
Id. (citing Blake, supra note 13, at 682-83).
192.
Hasty v. Rent-A-Driver, Inc., was decided May 29, 1984; Selox, Inc.
v. Ford was decided September 4, 1984; and CentralAdjustment Bureau, Inc. v.
Ingram was decided on September 17, 1984. See supra notes 179, 184, & 181.
193.
Efficiency minded courts should enforce covenants not to compete
when renegotiation is impossible; but otherwise they need to deter parties from
agreeing to broad covenants that over compensate the employer for investment
and are used to externalize training costs. See Eric A. Posner & George G. Tri-
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A recent matter decided by the Washington State Supreme
Court provides an example for leveling the playing field. In Labriola v. Pollard Group, Inc.,1 94 the Court clarified Washington5
19
State law concerning what constitutes adequate consideration.
The Court held "that independent consideration is required at the
time promises are made for a noncompete agreement when employment has already commenced." 196 The Court discussed in
Labriola the importance of a bargained-forexchange of promises
between the employer and employee. The agreement lacked consideration based on fact that the "[e]mployer did not incur additional duties or obligations from the noncompete agreement" and
that "[a]fter Employee executed the noncompete agreement, Employee remained an 'at-will' employee terminable at the Employer's pleasure."' 197 Justice Madsen, in a concurring opinion,
stressed the fact that "[c]ontinued at-will employment is never
in198
dependently sufficient to uphold a covenant not to compete."
However, the value of Labriola extends beyond its ruling.
The employee in Labriolawas awarded attorney fees. 199 Washington State, by statute, 20 0 awards attorney fees to the prevailing party
in those cases where the subject contract contains a one-sided attorney fee provision. 20 1 This statute allowed the employee to seek

antis, Covenants Not to Competefrom an Incomplete ContractsPerspective, U.

CHI. LAW & ECON., Olin Working Paper No. 137; Univ. of Va. Law & Econ.
Research Paper No. 01-08, available at http://ssm.com/abstract

=285805 (2001).
194.
100 P.3d 791 (Wash: 2004).
195.
Id. at 793-97.
196. Id. at 796.
197.
Id. at 795.
198.
Id. at 797.
199.
Id. at 796.
200.
WASH. REv. CODE § 4.84.330 (2004) (providing for attorney fees to
the prevailing party even if the case is voluntarily dismissed). See also Hawk v.
Branjes, 986 P.2d. 841, 844-45 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (applying section
4.84.330).
201.
Labriola, 100 P.3d at 796. The Labriolacourt explained that:
RCW 4.84.330 states that where a contract provision allows
for the awarding of attorneys fees and costs to one of the parties, 'the prevailing party, whether he is the party specified in
the contract []or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 35

declaratory and appellate relief, knowing that if he prevailed, reasonable fees and costs would be awarded, if the contract containing
the provision was invalidated. Likewise, the statute would have
provided the opportunity for the award of attorney fees, had the
Employer failed in an attempt to sue for enforcement of the covenant not to compete. California and Arkansas have similar statutes, 202 while Arizona, Texas, and Florida award fees to the prevailing party in covenant not to compete cases.2 °3
Such statutes have the effect of preventing the employer from
perpetuating the unequal bargaining power it had over its former
employee at contract inception. No longer is the departing employee taking such an economic risk by challenging an employer's
claim of breach of contract under a covenant not to compete. It
would appear that such a provision would also alleviate some of
the fears20 4of abuse expressed by the Tennessee Supreme Court in
Ingram.

V.

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

The law concerning covenants not to compete has been evolving along with changes in the economy and labor market ever since
Mitchel v. Reynolds in the early 1700s. It should be no surprise
that in this information age further change is needed. Next to the
family relationship, the employment relationship is arguably the
has. 205 It should not be
most important association an 2individual
06
treated as indentured servitude.
fees in addition to costs and necessary disbursements.' Attorneys fees and costs are awarded to the prevailing party even
when the contract containing the attorneys fee provision is invalidated.

Id. (alterations in original).
202.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308 (Michie 1999); CAL. CIV. CODE §
1717 (West 2004).
203.
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01 (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. §

542.335 (West 2004); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.5 1(c) (Vernon Supp.
2004).

204.
Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 37-39
(Tenn.1984).
205.
Arnow-Richman, supra note 158, at 162.
206.

Carey C. Lyon, Oppress the Employee: Louisiana's Approach to
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From both a judicial and economic efficiency standpoint, there
are some fundamental measures that can be taken to prevent such
disputes from reaching the courts, particularly appellate review.
Employers should be urged to use covenants not to compete sparingly, and when used, drafted narrowly. Confidentiality or proprietary information, 207 non-solicitation, 20 8 and no-hire agreements 209 should be used whenever possible in their place.
In the absence of a legislative public policy pronouncement
pertaining to covenants not to compete, the Tennessee Supreme
Court should look for opportunities to revisit the issue and perhaps
take some steps to level the playing field between the interest of
the employer and employee. Fundamental to this effort is the need
to ensure that covenants not to compete are truly a product of a
bargained for agreement. This can be partially addressed by providing clarification as to what constitutes adequate consideration to
support a covenant not to compete once employment has already
commenced. In addition, the Court should consider adopting
where appropriate, the federal court antitrust analysis as discussed
in Part III.C. of this Article. There are certainly situations where a
particular employer controls sufficient market power within a relevant market, for an otherwise reasonable covenant not to compete
to be unreasonable, given the employer's market presence.
At the trial court level, mediation should be recommended as
soon as possible once an action has been filed. Often it is the lack
of information concerning the extent of a departing employee's
future work activities that causes the former employer concern.
Mediation would serve the objective of returning the former employee to the workforce as quickly as possible while still protecting
the legitimate business interests of the former employer. Mediation also has the potential for allowing both parties to more clearly
understand what activities are perceived as a threat to competition,
and it allows them to structure a more definitive agreement that
hopefully both parties find advantageous. In some instances, the

NoncompetitionAgreements, 61 LA. L. REv. 605, 608-09 (2001).
207.
Richard R. Mainland, Contracts Limiting Competition by Former
Employees: A CaliforniaLaw Perspective, 340 PLI/PAT 119, 131-39 (1992).

208.
209.

Id. at 139-47.
Id. at 147-49.
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new employer may play a role in helping structure a workable
agreement, perhaps compensating the former employer for access
to the employee's services. There may even be situations where
the former employer is willing to pay the former21employee
to re0
time.
of
period
reasonable
a
for
main unemployed
Finally, in order to give the employer a greater incentive to
structure, negotiate and enforce only reasonable covenants not to
compete, the Tennessee Legislature should implement a law which
allows for reciprocal attorney fees in those agreements that contain
such provisions which only benefit the employer.211 It will not
only equalize the bargaining power between the parties, but ultimately serve to protect the employer's interests while also enhancing employee mobility, and thereby promote economic and technological growth within the state.

210.

See generally Greg T. Lembrich, Garden Leave: A Possible Solution

to the Uncertain Enforceability of Restrictive Employment Covenants, 102

COLUM. L. REV. 2291 (2002).
211.
It should model the broad "Breach of Contract" statutes as implanted
in: ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308 (Michie 2004); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717 (West
2004); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.330 (2004); or those that pertain strictly to
"Covenants Not to Compete": ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01 (West 2004);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335 (West 2004); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §
15.51 (c) (Vernon Supp. 2004).

